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Abstract—This paper investigates the physical layer security
(PLS) of a broadband in-home power line communication (PLC)
system when a malicious wireless device tries to eavesdrop private
messages exchanged between two PLC devices. Such a security
issue arises when electric power circuits, which are used for data
communication, are constituted by unshielded power cables. In
this regard, the hybrid wiretap channel model for formulating
achievable secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability is consid-
ered. Additionally, a data set of channel estimates and measured
additive noises obtained from a measurement campaign carried
out in several in-home facilities is used for providing practical
results, which can offer direction for dealing with the security
aspects of broadband in-home PLC systems in the physical layer
perspective. The attained results show high values of secrecy
outage probability for all chosen values of target secrecy rate
and total power transmission (practical and theoretical) when
the PLC devices are far from each other and the eavesdropper
is close to the PLC transmitter (i.e., the distance is shorter
than 2 meters). Overall, the numerical results show that the
vulnerability of broadband in-home PLC systems, in terms of
PLS, is relevant when practical values of total transmission power
apply. Therefore, a rethinking of the use of unshielded power
cables or new designs of the broadband in-home PLC system
deserves special attention for ensuring security at the physical
layer.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, power line communica-
tions, wireless communications, hybrid wiretap channel model,
secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, power line communication (PLC) systemshave been widely studied by both academic and business
sectors since electric power infrastructures are pervasive and
the connections to them are ubiquitous. Moreover, they support
data communication for indoor (residential and commercial
buildings) and outdoor (low- and medium-voltages) electric
power grids [1]–[3]. Currently, transportation systems (e.g.,
car, ship, train, spacecraft and aircraft) [4]–[8] have con-
stituted a new frontier for PLC systems. Despite the well-
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known advantages for data communication, such as omnipres-
ence, low-cost implementation, and easy installation when
the voltage level is low (i.e., below 400 V), electric power
systems (generation, transmission, and distribution) were ini-
tially designed and deployed for energy delivery rather than
data communication. Therefore, data carrying signals traveling
through electric power grids may suffer severe degradation
and attenuation due to the long distance between source
and destination nodes; the use of high frequencies for data
communication in a non-ideal conductor (i.e., power cables);
the presence of multipath effects due to the existence of
impedance mismatching at the branching points and load’s
connection points; the noise generated by the dynamic of
loads (e.g., consumers and utilities) [2], [9]–[13]; coupling
losses in the injecting and extracting circuits belonging to the
front/end of PLC modems [3], [14], and interference with other
telecommunication systems operating in the same frequency
band because power cables are usually unshielded1.
In [15], [16] were shown that the unshielded characteristic
of power cables is an opportunity for having a hybrid PLC-
wireless system2, in which PLC and wireless devices operating
in the same frequency band can communicate with each other.
On the other hand, the broadcast nature of electric power
grids and the fact that these grids are mainly constituted by
unshielded power cables can potentially turn PLC systems
vulnerable to malicious users [15], [16]. As a matter of fact,
PLC signals (i.e., data carrying signals) flowing through an
unshielded power cable radiates electromagnetic fields that can
be sensed by a wireless device operating in the same frequency
band and located in the vicinity of the electric power circuit. If
the wireless device is a malicious one, then the investigation of
physical layer security (PLS) for PLC systems becomes a very
appealing one to quantify the lack of security in these media
and, as a consequence, to circumvent the leaking information
from the PLC system to a wireless device.
The idea of analyzing security at the physical layer level was
brought to the attention of the academic community in 1970’s
[17]–[19]. In particular, [17] introduced the degraded wiretap
channel. In the sequel, [18] evaluated the secrecy capacity
for the Gaussian wiretap channel and [19] proposed a more
general model known as the non-degraded wiretap channel.
Recently, fading wiretap channels [20]–[22] and multiple-input
1Aerial unshielded power cables are used in almost all electric power
systems. Underground and shielded are used in high-density downtown areas.
2PLC-wireless means PLC and wireless channels are used in cascade or
concatenated.
2multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels [23]–[27], among
others, have been investigated. For a review of this area, see
[28].
According to the literature, few investigations have assessed
the security of PLC systems under the PLS perspective [29]–
[31]. [29] analyzed the secrecy capacity for both PLC and
hybrid PLC/wireless3 single relay channels in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. Whereas [30] introduced an ar-
tificial noise scheme to improve the security of the hybrid
PLC/wireless channel. Last, [31] assessed PLS of the low-bit-
rate hybrid PLC/wireless channel and its incomplete versions
by adopting achievable ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability. Nonetheless, these studies have not considered
PLC signals radiated from the power cable to the air and
accessed by a malicious wireless device and discussed analyses
based on the use of real data set to quantify PLS in broadband
in-home PLC systems4. According to the authors understand-
ing, this problem may be entirely portrayed by the well-
known in-home hybrid PLC-wireless channels [15], [16] since
they correctly characterize this environment. These studies
discussed measurement campaign, statistical characterization,
modeling, and analysis of measured channels associated with
the existing link between PLC and wireless devices (i.e.,
hybrid PLC-wireless channel), which are supposed to be
operating in the same frequency band (1.7−100 MHz). Addi-
tionally, [15] presented the in-home PLC channels obtained in
the same measurement campaign and compared them with the
respective hybrid PLC-wireless counterparts, which constitutes
relevant information for differentiating these channels.
It is essential to point out that such in-home hybrid PLC-
wireless channels may represent the scenario where a mali-
cious wireless device threatens the security of a broadband
PLC system, see Fig. 1. The PLC transmitter (Alice) sends
private messages to the legitimate PLC receiver (Bob) whereas
a malicious wireless device (Eve) eavesdrops the information
carried by the PLC signal from its radiated component, which
is a consequence of the propagation of the PLC signal through
an unshielded cable. This scenario is termed hybrid wiretap
channel. Observe that, in this kind of channel, Alice can
not realize that Eve is overhearing private messages sent to
Bob, which is a typical situation associated with the use of
unshielded power cables.
In this regard, this study aims to quantitatively discuss
important issues related to PLS when the hybrid wiretap
channel model, the frequency band 1.7−86MHz (in agreement
with ITU-T Rec. G.9964), and the use of a data set constituted
by estimates of the channel frequency response (CFR) and
measured additive noises are taken into account. The main
contributions of this study are as follows:
• Introductions of the hybrid wiretap channel model and
mathematical formulations of achievable secrecy rate and
secrecy outage probability. Also, discussion of numerical
results related to secrecy outage probability and ergodic
3PLC/wireless means PLC and wireless channels are used in parallel.
4The term broadband PLC system was introduced by the PLC community
and owns a different meaning in comparison to the telecommunication
community. It refers to high-data-rate PLC systems that cover the frequency
bands 1.7 − 30 MHz, 1.7 − 50 MHz, and 1.7 − 86 MHz.
achievable secrecy rate considering a passive eavesdrop-
per (i.e., the channel state information (CSI) of Eve is
not available at Alice). Numerical results make use of a
real data set obtained from the measurement campaign
carried out in Brazilian in-home facilities [15], [16].
• Performance analysis considering the following issues:
distinct distances between Alice and Bob; different po-
sitions of Eve in relation to Alice and Bob; distinct
levels of the total transmission power (e.g., practical
and theoretical); and two types of resource allocation
technique (optimal and uniform). Such an analysis allows
to quantify how much a wireless device can threaten the
security of a broadband PLC system in practice.
Based on the numerical analysis, it is clear that the vulner-
ability of the broadband in-home PLC system is relevant for
practical values of total transmission power when unshielded
power cables are part of the electric power grid and a malicious
wireless device is near the PLC transmitter. In the worst
scenario, in which Bob is far from Alice and Eve is close to
Alice (i.e., the distance is shorter than 2 meters), the secrecy
outage probability is high regardless of the total transmission
power (practical and theoretical values) or the adopted target
secrecy rate. In other words, the level of security at the
physical layer of the broadband in-home PLC system may be
close to zero. Therefore, a rethinking of the use of unshielded
power cables or the introduction of novelties in broadband in-
home PLC systems has to be carried out for ensuring security
at the physical layer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the hybrid wiretap channel model; Section III
describes mathematical formulations for achievable secrecy
rate and secrecy outage probability; Section IV shows the nu-
merical results; and, finally, Section V states some concluding
remarks.
Notation: Lower-case and upper-case boldface symbols
denote vectors in the discrete-time and -frequency domains,
respectively. ΛD , diag{D[0], D[1], · · · , D[N − 1]} rep-
resents the diagonal matrix of the N-length random vector
D. RDD = E[DD
†] is the auto-correlation matrix of the
random vector D. F is the N-size and normalized discrete-
time Fourier transform (DFT) matrix. 0N×1 is the N-length
column vector of zeros. IN is the N × N identity matrix.
det(ΛD) denotes the determinant of the matrix ΛD. h(·) refers
to the entropy function. | · | denotes the modulus operator. ‖ · ‖
is the Euclidean norm. E[·] is the expectation operator. {·}T
denotes the transpose operator. {·}† is the Hermitian operator.
tr(·) is the trace operator. P{c < d} is the probability that c is
less than d.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
PLS is an interesting issue for investigation in PLC systems
since in the majority of the cases, the power cables are
unshielded and densely interconnected in low-voltage levels.
Also, they are easy to connect and access physically. From
the author point of view, a fundamental question about PLS
in broadband PLC systems context is how secure these systems
can be related to the presence of malicious device connected
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Fig. 1: Illustration of broadband data communication between two PLC devices under the presence of a malicious wireless
device.
to the power line (e.g., the eavesdropper is another PLC device
operating in the same frequency band) or wirelessly connected
to the power line (e.g., the eavesdropper is a wireless device
operating in the same frequency band and the vicinity of
the power line). Regarding the latter form of eavesdropping,
this section formulates the problem to investigate PLS of a
broadband PLC system, which operates in in-home facilities,
when a malicious wireless device is located in the vicinity to
overhear the private messages exchanged between two PLC
devices.
In this regard, the block diagram in Fig. 2 shows the investi-
gated hybrid wiretap channel model. A PLC transmitter Alice
(A) sends private messages to the legitimate PLC receiver
Bob (B). Meanwhile, a malicious wireless device Eve (E)
located in the vicinity of Alice or Bob overhears part of the
private messages. This scenario may happen due to an inherent
characteristic of unshielded power cables: they radiate part of
the PLC signal flowing through them. In this scenario, Eve is
operating in the same frequency band of Alice and Bob and she
is capable of sensing the radiation of the PLC signal without
Alice realizes the presence of Eve. In accord with [15], [16],
the wireless propagation of the radiated PLC signal can be
covered by the broadband hybrid PLC-wireless channels. Also,
the respective broadband in-home PLC channels presented in
[15] can represent the link between Alice and Bob.
Considering that PLC and hybrid PLC-wireless channels
are time-varying systems, one can state that {hl[n,m]}, where
l ∈ {B, E}, denotes the discrete-time version of the time-
varying channels associated with Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve
links, respectively. Based on this assumption, the discrete-time
representation of the received signal at the input of the lth
receiver is given by
yl[n] =
∞∑
m=−∞
Ax[m]hl[n, m] + vl[n], (1)
where {x[n]} is constituted by an infinite number of N-length
symbols (N-block symbols) and refers to the transmitted
sequence; A ∈ R+ is the amplitude of the transmitted sequence;
hl[n,m] denotes channel impulse response (CIR) seen by the
lth receiver in the nth sample when an impulse is injected
in the mth sample by Alice; and {vl[n]} denotes the additive
noise sequence. It is assumed that both {x[n]} and {vl[n]} are
independent and wide-sense stationary random processes.
BobAlice
Eve
PSfrag replacements
hB[n, m]
hE[n, m]
x[n] yB[n]
yE [n]
vB[n]
vE[n]
Fig. 2: Block diagram of the hybrid wiretap channel model.
The continuous and dashed lines represent the power line the
hybrid PLC-wireless links, respectively.
Assuming that the time interval associated with an N-block
symbol is shorter than the coherence time of the PLC and
hybrid PLC-wireless channels in the continuous time-domain,
then these channels can be considered linear and time-invariant
during a time interval corresponding to an N-block symbol.
In this regard, the discrete-time CIR during a time interval
corresponding to an N-block symbol is time-invariant and, as
a consequence, hl[m, n] = hl[n − m], such that {hl[n]}
Ll−1
n=0
,
where Ll is the length of CIR associated with the link between
Alice and the lth receiver. The vectorial representation of
the discrete-time version of such channels during one N-
block symbol duration is hl = [hl[0], hl[1], . . . , hl[Ll −
1]]T , while Hl = [Hl[0], Hl[1], . . . , Hl[N − 1]]
T
denotes its vectorial representation in the frequency do-
main, where Hl = F [h
T
l
, 0
T
N−Ll
]T and N denotes the
number of sub-channels. Hereafter, the diagonal matrices
ΛHl = diag {Hl[0], Hl[1], . . . , Hl[N − 1]} and Λ |Hl |2 =
diag{|Hl[0]|
2
, |Hl[1]|
2
, · · · , |Hl[N − 1]|
2} will be used.
Moreover, the vectorial representation of the N-block sym-
bol, which is defined in the frequency domain for transmission,
is X ∈ CN×1 so that E[X] = 0N×1 and E[XX
†] = NΛP,
where ΛP = diag {P[0], P[1], . . . , P[N − 1]} is the matrix
4representation of the allocated power and tr(ΛP) = PT is the
total transmission power. Also, Vl ∈ C
N×1 is the frequency
domain vectorial representation of the zero mean additive
noise, such that E[Vl] = 0N×1 and E[VlV
†
l
] = NΛPVl ,
in which ΛPVl = diag
{
PVl [0], PVl [1], . . . , PVl [N − 1]
}
and
PVl [k] is the additive noise power in the k
th sub-channel.
Given the aforementioned formulation, the following
twofold questions arise: How secure is a broadband PLC
system at the physical layer level when Eve is a wireless
device operating in the same frequency band and she is in
the vicinity of Alice or Bob in a practical perspective? In
other words, how much information is leaked to Eve and how
it impacts the secrecy outage probability? Aiming to answer
these questions, Section III deduces the achievable secrecy rate
and secrecy outage probability for the hybrid wiretap channel
model and Section IV discusses numerical results that support
important findings related to PLS in PLC systems.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE AND SECRECY OUTAGE
PROBABILITY
This section deduces mathematical expressions to compute
the achievable secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability for
the hybrid wiretap channel model. To do so, similar to the
linear Gaussian relay channel (LGRC) addressed in [32], PLC
and hybrid PLC-wireless channels are assumed N-block linear
Gaussian channels with finite memory (i.e., Lmax = max
l
Ll).
However, the inter-block interference caused by the memory
of CIRs and the correlated noises make difficult to evaluate
the achievable data rate [33]. On the other hand, the proposal
in [33] can overcome this drawback. It states that the N-block
circular Gaussian relay channel (CGRC) eliminates the inter-
block interference when N ≫ Lmax. Besides, LGRC tends to
N-CGRC as N → ∞. Hence, N-CGRC channels model PLC
and hybrid PLC-wireless channels since N → ∞.
Assuming perfect synchronization, the vectorial representa-
tion, in the frequency domain, of the received symbol at the
lth receiver is given by
Yl = ΛHlX + Vl . (2)
Then the mutual information between Alice and the lth re-
ceiver can be expressed as
I(X;Yl) = h(Yl) − h(Yl |X)
= h(Yl) − (h(ΛHlX|X) + h(Vl |X))
= h(Yl) − h(Vl). (3)
Considering the additive noise and transmitted symbols as
Gaussian random processes, the entropy of Yl and Vl are given
by
h(Yl) = log2
[
(pie)N det(RYY,l)
]
(4)
and
h(Vl) = log2
[
(pie)N det(RVV,l)
]
,
(5)
respectively, in which RYY,l = ΛHlRXXΛ
†
Hl
+RVV,l. Thus, the
capacity between Alice and the lth receiver can be expressed
as
Cl = max
fX(x):tr(RXX)≤NPT
I(X;Yl)
= max
tr(ΛP )≤PT
log2
[
det
(
IN + Λγl
)]
, (6)
where fX(x) is the joint density function of X and
Λγl =
ΛHlRXXΛ
†
Hl
RVV,l
= ΛPΛ |Hl |2Λ
−1
PVl
. (7)
Hence, the secrecy capacity is given by [34]
CS = max
fX(x):tr(RXX)≤NPT
[I(X;YB) − I(X;YE )]
+ [bps/Hz], (8)
in which max[b]+ = max(0, b). In contrast, (8) is difficult to
calculate. In accord with [34], a lower bound can be used as
follows
CS ≥
[
max
fX(x):tr(RXX)≤NPT
I(X;YB) − max
fX(x):tr(RXX)≤NPT
I(X;YE)
]
+
= [CB − CE ]
+
. (9)
As discussed in [35], a wiretap code is necessary to obtain
the secrecy capacity. Further, for having perfect secrecy (i.e.,
the private messages exchanged between Alice and Bob are
entirely hidden from Eve) such codes have to fulfill the
following requirements: (i) the error probability of Bob must
decrease as the code length increases (reliability constraint)
and (ii) the equivocation rate of Eve must increase as the code
length increases (secrecy constraint). The wiretap code can be
designed based on the following rates: (i) rate of transmitted
codewords, RB ∈ R+ , and (ii) rate of transmitted confidential
information (i.e., target secrecy rate), R ∈ R+. Notice that
RB ≤ CB is chosen to guarantee the reliability constraint
whereas RE > CE guarantees the secrecy constraint, in which
RE = RB − R is the rate of redundancy used to confuse Eve.
Observe that to achieve the maximum R, the complete CSIs
of Bob and Eve have to be available at Alice. However, it is
challenging for Alice to obtain CSI of Eve since, in practice,
Eve is passive and then RE > CE cannot always be fulfilled
(i.e., perfect secrecy is not guaranteed). In this case, Alice
may choose a fixed R and the secrecy outage probability turns
a reasonable approach to quantify the level of security of a
data communication system [36]. In this way, one may use
the following achievable secrecy rate:
RS =
1
N
[
log2
[
det
(
IN + ΛγB
) ]
−
log2
[
det
(
IN + ΛγE
)] ]+
[bps/Hz]. (10)
Consequently, the secrecy outage probability can expressed as
PS(R) = P {RS < R}
= P
{
det
(
IN + ΛγB
IN + ΛγE
)
< 2RN
}
. (11)
Notice that perfect secrecy is achieved when RS > R whereas
RS < R means that perfect secrecy is not guaranteed.
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Fig. 3: R¯S × PT for the hybrid wiretap channel under the adoption of both OA and UA techniques.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical analysis of secrecy outage
probability for the hybrid wiretap channel model assuming that
Eve is passive and Alice has only CSI of Bob. Additionally, the
ergodic achievable secrecy rate R¯S = BwEHB,HE [RS] is also
evaluated, where Bw is the frequency bandwidth. Although
theoretical, R¯S is an interesting parameter to quantify the leak-
age information to Eve when data communication is performed
between Alice and Bob. The frequency band 1.7−86MHz (i.e.,
broadband applications in the sense of the PLC community)
and N = 2048 apply. Optimal power allocation (OA) by using
the water-filling algorithm [37] and uniform power allocation
(UA) techniques are taken into account. The total transmission
power (PT ) ranges from −30 dBm to 30 dBm, in which the
intervals [−30, 0) dBm and [0, 30] dBm cover theoretical and
practical values of PT , respectively.
It is important to state that real data is used to analyze
the hybrid wiretap channel model [15], [16]. Such a data
set, obtained from a measurement campaign carried out in
Brazilian in-home facilities, constitutes estimates of PLC and
hybrid PLC-wireless CFRs. They are considered to represent,
respectively, the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links. In particular,
hybrid PLC-wireless CFR estimates allow one to analyze two
kinds of situation for the hybrid wiretap channel model:
• Eve is close to Alice: This situation represents the hybrid
PLC-wireless CFRs measured within a 2 meters radius
centered at the outlet where the PLC transmitter (Alice)
was connected.
• Eve is close to Bob: This situation represents the hybrid
PLC-wireless CFRs measured within a 2 meters radius
centered at the outlet where the PLC receiver (Bob) was
connected.
Following [16], the situations where Eve is close to Alice and
is close to Bob are named, respectively, short-path (SP) and
long-path (LP).
Table I lists the maximum, mean, minimum, standard de-
viation (SD), 90% percentile values of the normalized SNR
(nSNR) multi-channel regarding the estimates of PLC and hy-
brid PLC-wireless CFRs. According to [37], the mathematical
definition of the nSNR multi-channel parameter is
γ¯l , det
(
IN + Λ |Hl |2Λ
−1
PVl
)1/N
− 1. (12)
From Table I, observe that the maximum γ¯l values of PLC,
hybrid PLC-wireless SP, and hybrid PLC-wireless LP chan-
nels are, respectively, 82.8, 69.6, and 56.4 dB whereas the
minimum γ¯l values for them are 51.1, 54.3, and 36.9 dB,
respectively. Notice that as Bob moves away from Alice, γ¯B
TABLE I: Statistics of γ¯l in Decibels (dB)
Receiver Maximum Mean Minimum SD 90 %
PLC (γ¯B ) 82.8 70.2 51.1 9.3 81.2
Hybrid SP (γ¯E ) 69.6 61.1 54.3 2.5 64.1
Hybrid LP (γ¯E ) 56.4 47.2 36.9 3.8 51.9
decreases and, as a consequence, it may jeopardize PLS. On
the other hand, if Bob is close to Alice, higher values of γ¯B are
observed, making the decoding of the information exchanged
between Alice and Bob a hard task to be accomplished
by Eve. In this regard and for the sake of simplicity, the
assessment of numerical results considers three distinct ranges
of γ¯B: γ¯B,1 ∈ [51.1, 61.1) dB, γ¯B,2 ∈ [61.1, 72.3) dB, and
γ¯B,3 ∈ [72.3, 82.9] dB.
Figs. 3(a), (b), and (c) show R¯S ×PT for the hybrid wiretap
channel model under the adoption of OA and UA together
with, respectively, γ¯B,1, γ¯B,2, and γ¯B,3. In addition to that,
the scenario having Eve far away from Alice and Bob (i.e.,
CE = 0) account for a reference to analyze the leakage
information from the channel between Alice and Bob to Eve.
Figs. 3(a), (b), and (c) show that the difference between
OA and UA is minimal regardless of PT and the distance
between Alice and Bob. Also, notice that as Bob moves away
from Alice, RS decreases in both SP and LP scenarios, i.e.,
more information is leaked to Eve. In particular, for γ¯B,1
(see Fig. 3(a)), the SP scenario has R¯S around zero for UA,
regardless of PT . For instance, R¯S achieves only 30 kbps when
PT = −10 dBm and OA are adopted. Also, the differences
between SP and LP scenarios, in terms of R¯S, are almost
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the same in Figs. 3(a), (b), and (c), achieving the values
322.9, 355.2, and 353.7 kbps, respectively, for PT = 30 dBm.
Lastly, considering PT = 30 dBm, the R¯S values of SP, LP,
and CE = 0 scenarios are equal to, respectively, 5.84, 328.7,
and 685.8 kbps in Fig. 3(a); 187.6, 542.8, and 987.9 kbps
in Fig. 3(b); and 471.0, 824.7, and 1, 296 kbps in Fig. 3(c).
For the practical values of total transmission power (i.e.,
0 ≤ PT ≤ 30 dBm), R¯S > 0 occurs for γ¯B,2 and γ¯B,3 in
both SP and LP scenarios. In contrast, if γ¯B,1 applies, values
of R¯S around zero arise, mainly with UA.
Fig. 4 depicts PS × R for the hybrid wiretap channel model
considering PT ∈ {−30, 0, 30} dBm. In this regard, OA (see
Figs. 4(a), (b), and (c)) and UA (see Figs. 4(d), (e), and (f))
are presented. Also, γ¯B,1, γ¯B,2, and γ¯B,3 are considered in
Figs. 4(a), (b), and (c), respectively, and in Figs. 4(d), (e),
and (f), respectively. The figures show a minimal difference
between OA and UA so that a small advantage for OA can be
observed in γ¯B,1 and γ¯B,2 cases when PT is equal to −30 and
0 dBm. Still in Fig. 4, notice that as Bob moves away from
Alice, PS(R) increases significantly. In particular, considering
OA, PT = 30 dBm, and R = 6 bps/Hz, SP and LP scenarios
present PS(R) equal to 1 for γ¯B,1. Also, SP and LP scenarios
show PS(R) around 0.64 and equal to 0, respectively, for γ¯B,3
and PS(R) equal to 1 and around 0.47, respectively, for γ¯B,2.
Finally, observe that when PT = −30 dBm and R ≥ 1 bps/Hz,
PS(R) is equal to 1 in both SP and LP scenarios regardless
of the distance between Alice and Bob and the used power
allocation technique. Finally, as shown in Figs. 4(a) and (d),
the practical values of total transmission power (i.e., 0 and
30 dBm) result in high values of PS(R) for the SP scenario.
Fig. 5 shows PS(R) × PT for the hybrid wiretap channel
model considering R ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00} bps/Hz. Also, OA
(see Figs. 5(a), (b), and (c)) and UA (Figs. 5(d), (e), and (f))
are taken into account. In addition, γ¯B,1, γ¯B,2, and γ¯B,3 are
considered in Figs. 5(a), (b), and (c), respectively, and in Figs.
5(d), (e), and (f), respectively. Notice that, as PT increases the
difference between OA and UA tends to zero. On the other
hand, if PT decreases, then a small improvement in favor of
OA occurs. Considering the LP scenario, OA, and practical
values of total transmission power, i.e., 0 ≤ PT ≤ 30 dBm,
PS(R) is close to zero for γ¯B,1, γ¯B,2, and γ¯B,3 regardless of
R, except when PT = 0 dBm in the γ¯B,1 case, in which PS(R)
is around 0.2. Concerning the SP scenario, if OA and 0 ≤
PT ≤ 30 dBm apply, then PS(R) is close to zero for γ¯B,3
regardless of R and for γ¯B,2 when R is equal to 0.25 bps/Hz.
Besides, R = 0.50 and 1.00 bps/Hz provide PS(R) < 1 and
PS(R) ≤ 0.4, respectively, for γ¯B,2. Lastly, observe that PS(R)
values higher than 0.40, 0.60 and 0.90 are found when R is
equal to 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 bps/Hz, respectively, for γ¯B,1.
Overall, the attained results show that Eve may be able to
eavesdrop confidential information exchanged between Alice
and Bob in the SP scenario together with γ¯B,1, which account
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Fig. 5: PS(R) × PT with R ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00} bps/Hz for the hybrid wiretap channel.
for the situations where Alice is far from Bob (i.e., the distance
is around 6 meters) and Eve is close to Alice (i.e., the distance
is shorter than 2 meters), respectively. Moreover, regardless
of R, the use of practical or theoretical values of PT results
in high values of PS(R), mainly when UA is adopted. Such
finding shows that the radiation of the PLC signal could jeop-
ardize PLS if Eve is a wireless device operating in the same
frequency band and located close to Alice, which constitutes a
typical scenario associated with electric power grids composed
of unshielded power cables in in-home facilities.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has quantitatively investigated in a real scenario
how secure a broadband in-home PLC system can be when
a passive wireless device, operating in the vicinity of power
cables, overhears private messages exchanged between two
PLC devices. In this regard, with the adoption of the hybrid
wiretap channel model, mathematical formulations of achiev-
able secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability have been
provided and numerically analyzed.
The numerical results have shown how vulnerable a broad-
band in-home PLC system can be when unshielded power
cables constitute electric power grids and a malicious wireless
device is located in the vicinity of them. In the worst scenario,
where Bob is far from Alice while Eve is close to Alice
(i.e., the distance is shorter than 2 meters), high values of
secrecy outage probability arise for all analyzed values of
target secrecy rate and total power transmission (practical and
theoretical values).
Overall, the discussed results reinforce the importance and
necessity of the introduction of novelties in the design of PLC
devices or the use of shielded power cables in the electrical
power grid for performing both energy delivery and data
communication when the discussion related to the physical
layer of PLC systems involves security issues.
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